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THE TORO COMPANY v. WHITE CONSOLIDATED
INDUSTRIES, INC.
C. Douglass Thomas'

I. BACKGROUND

The Toro Company ('Toro") obtained U.S. Patent 4,694,528
('528 patent) on September 22, 1997.1 The '528 patent describes and
claims a hand-held convertible vacuum/blower that is useful for yard
work. The convertible vacuum/blower can operate in a vacuum mode
or a blower mode. In the vacuum mode, the hand-held convertible
vacuum/blower is able to vacuum up leaves and other debris. In the
blower mode, the hand-held convertible vacuum/blower is able to
blow leaves or other debris.
The primary embodiment described in the body of the '528
patent uses a restriction ring as part of an air inlet cover ("cover") to
increase the pressure at an air outlet when the convertible
vacuum/blower is operated in a blower mode. In other words, the
restriction ring is inserted into the air inlet when in the blower mode,
but removed from the air inlet when in the vacuum mode. Since the
primary embodiment formed the restriction ring as part of the cover,
the restriction ring was automatically inserted when the cover was in
place for blower operation and was automatically removed when the
cover was removed for vacuum operation. In the blower mode, the
cover is attached to the housing of the convertible vacuum/blower
using a tab and detent system.
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. and WCI Outdoor Products,
Inc. (together "White") manufactured and sold a competing
convertible vacuum/blower. White's product had a cover and a
restriction ring for an air inlet, but the restriction ring was a separate
part from the cover. To operate White's product as a blower, the
' Mr.Thomas is a partner in the Silicon Valley office of Beyer Weaver & Thomas, LLP. This
case note reflects the present thoughts of the author, which should not be attributed to Beyer
Weaver & Thomas, LLP or any former, current or future clients of Beyer Weaver & Thomas,
LLP. The author is grateful for the assistance provided by Mr. David Banie for his help in
preparing this case note.
1. U.S. Pat. No. 4,694,528 to Comer et al. ("528 patent").
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restriction ring had to be manually inserted into an air inlet opening
and then covered by the cover. To operate as a vacuum, the cover
would be opened and the restriction ring manually removed from the
air inlet opening. Further, with White's product, the cover was
attached to the housing by a hinge and latch mechanism.
Toro sued White in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota for infringement of claims 16 and 17 of the '528 patent.2
The district court granted Toro's Motion for Summary Judgement that
claim 16 of the '528 patent was literally infringed by White's
product.' The district court, however, did not consider infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. White then appealed the district
court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit").
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION AND ANALYSIS
This case turned on claim construction. As expected, the Federal
Circuit construed claim 16 de novo because claim construction is a
question of law. Even so, the panel, consisting of Judges Newman,
Friedman and Rader, did not all agree. Judges Newman and
Friedman signed on to a majority opinion, while Judge Rader
authored a dissenting opinion. The majority's opinion is discussed
below, followed by a brief discussion of the dissenting opinion.
The claim at issue, claim 16, was as follows:
16. A convertible vacuum-blower comprising:
[1] a housing having an air inlet and an air outlet;
[2] a motor supported in said housing
[3] an impeller having a plurality of impeller blades supported for
rotary motion in said housing, in fluid communication with said air
inlet and said air outlet, and rotatably driven by said motor,
[4]a removable air inlet cover for covering said air inlet, said air
inlet cover having apertures for passage of air through the cover,
[5]attachment means for removably securing said air inlet cover to
said housing; and

2. Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
3. See Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1008, 1019 (D. Minn.
1996). Toro had conceded to the district court that claim 17 was not literally infiringed. See
Toro, 199 F.3d at 1298.
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[6]said cover including means for increasing the pressure
developed by said vacuum-blower during operation as a blower
when air is being supplied to said impeller through said apertured
cover. 4
On appeal, Toro and Wite disputed the interpretation of two
particular phrases within claim 16. Specifically, the phrases of claim
16 in dispute were: (1) "attachment means for removably securing
said air inlet cover to said housing" (clause 5), and (2) "cover
including means for increasing the pressure" (clause 6).
With respect to the law of claim construction, the majority
wanted to interpret the claim as would a person of experience in the
field.5 Although the words in dispute were ordinary or common, the
majority felt that the dictionary definitions proffered by each side
were not particular helpful. 6 The majority summarized their notion of
claim construction as follows:
In judicial "claim construction" the court must achieve the same
understanding of the patent, as the document whose meaning and
scope have legal consequences, as would a person experienced in
the technology of the invention. Such a person would not rely
solely on a dictionary of general linguistic usage, but would
understand the claims in light of the specification and the prior art,
guided by the prosecution history and experience in the
7
technologic field.
A. FirstDisputed Claim Phrase:Attachment Means
The first claim construction issue concerned the claim element
"attachment means for removably securing said air inlet cover to said
housing" of clause 5 in claim 16. There was apparently no dispute
over whether this claim limitation should be interpreted according to

4. Toro, 199 F.3d at 1298. Claim 16, '528 patent (bracketed numerals added by court). It
is interesting to note that the '528 patent had 17 claims, of which only claims 1 and 16 were
independent claims. See '528 patent at col. 7-10. Claim 1, although generally similar to claim
16, was not asserted. Claim 1 is directed to a convertible vacuum/blower but its novelty is
focused on a safety switch mechanism that allowed the motor to operate when the air inlet was
covered but not when the air inlet was uncovered. See id at col. 7 (lines 30-47). Claim 16, in
contrast, did not include any safety switch mechanism limitations, as its novelty was focused on
the "including" of means for increasing the pressure during operation as a blower. See id. at col.
9 (lines 14- 18) to col. 10 (lines 1- 11)..
5. See Toro, 199 F.3d at 1299.
6. See id.
7. Id.
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35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 which is means plus function claim style.8 The
'528 patent described the invention as using a tab and detent system
to secure an air inlet cover to the housing of the convertible
vacuum/blower. As a result, the tab and detent approach of the '528
patent rendered the air inlet cover completely removable from the
housing. In contrast, the White's product used a hinged cover instead
of a tab and detent design. As a consequence, White's cover was not
completely removable because it always remained attached at the
hinge.9 The majority agreed with the district court that the phrase
"removably securing" does not require that the cover be entirely
separate from the housing, but instead merely refers to removal of the
cover from the air inlet.10
The majority then concluded that the district court did not clearly
err in ruling that the hinge and latch of White's product were
equivalent the tab and detent approach described in the '528 patent."
To support this conclusion, the majority points to interchangeability
as evidenced by a prior art reference. 12 Specifically, the majority
stated: "[t]he use of a latch with a hinged cover is shown in the prior
art, performing the identical function of securing the cover to the air
inlet during use as a blower, using known interchangeable
structures.' 3 Despite the design differences, the majority found the
attachment means present in White's product. Thus, the majority
affirmed the district court's interpretation of the first disputed claim
phrase (clause 5).
B. Second Disputed Claim Phrase: Including
The other claim construction question concerned whether clause
6 in claim 16 covers a restriction ring that is not attached to the cover.
The pertinent claim language of clause 6 is "said cover including
means for increasing the pressure... ." Recall, the description of the
8. See35U.S.C.§112 6(1994).
9. See Toro, 199 F.3d at 1299. (White unsuccessfully argued that the '528 patent did not
intend to include an attached cover.) The prior art reference was apparently U.S. Pat. No.
4,325,163 to Mattson et al. which is not only mentioned in the background section of '528
patent but also a cited reference on the '528 patent's front page. See '528 patent at front page
and col. I (lines 10- 38).
10. See Toro, 199 F.3d at 1300.
11. See id. Note the "clear error" standard of review applied to the equivalence
determination under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (1994).
12. See id. It is interesting to note here that the scope of equivalents provided to the
attachment means seems to be relatively large given that the hinge and latch design was found to
be equivalent to the tab and detent design.
13. Id.
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primary embodiment of the invention in the '528 patent is a restriction
ring as part of the air inlet cover, whereas in White's product, the
restriction ring is a separate part from the cover. Inthe '528 patent,
the restriction ring is the structure responsible for the means for
increasing pressure.
The district court found that: "the term 'including,' correctly
construed, 'suggests the containment of something as a component or
subordinate part of a larger whole,' and comprehends a separate
restriction ring that is not part of the cover but is separately inserted
and removed. '14 In other words, the district court concluded that the
cover includes the restriction ring regardless of whether attached to
the cover.
On review, the majority noted that this claim construction
question-as to whether the restriction ring must be attached to the
cover-was not a question under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6. The majority
considered various things in interpreting whether the words
"including" and "cover", as a matter of law, require that the cover and
the ring be attached to each other. The majority noted that "[t]he
specification and drawings show the restriction ring as 'part of' and
permanently attached to the [air inlet] cover."' 5 It is also true, as the
majority noted, that the specification of the '528 patent does not state
that the flow restriction ring and the air inlet cover can be two distinct
components.16
The majority then goes on to disparage the
specification of the '52.8 patent. Specifically, the majority opinion
states:
The specification shows only a structure whereby the restriction
ring is "part of' the cover, in permanent attachment. This is not
simply the preferred embodiment; it is the only embodiment....
The description of the invention states that the ring is inserted and
removed "automatically" when the cover is inserted or removed.
Thus when the cover is closed for operation in the blower mode,
the ring that is "attached to the inside of the air inlet cover by a
plurality of screws" is thereby put into place. It is inserted simply

14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 1301. This is correct. FIG. 4 of the '528 patent shows a ring 76 formed with an
insert 72 that is attached to an air inlet cover 50 (col. 4, lines 47-53; col. 5, lines 19-22).
Further, at column 7, lines 6-7 the specification refers to the flow restriction ring 76 as part of
the air inlet cover 50. Hence, it is clear that the preferred embodiment of the invention
described in the '528 patent formed the flow restriction ring (i.e., means for increasing pressure)
as attached or part of the air inlet cover. See '528 patent.
16. See Toro. 199 F.3d at 1301.
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by closing the cover; it is removed by opening the cover.

Finally, the majority concluded that "[tihe specification does not
describe an invention broader than this description of the cover and
the restriction ring 'automatically' inserted and removed together."' 18
In anticipation of the dissent's objections, the majority also states:
"[tihis is not a case of limiting the claims to a 'preferred embodiment'
of an invention that has been more broadly disclosed. It is well
established that the preferred embodiment does not limit broader
claims that are supported by the written description."' 19
Toro also attempted to broaden the interpretation of "including"
by relying on the doctrine of claim differentiation. Claim 17 depends
from claim 16 and, among other things, indicates that the restriction
ring is "carmed by the cover." Hence, claim 17 would seem to
support (under the guise of the doctrine of claim differentiation)
requiring that the term "including" be broadly read as Toro desired.
Instead, the majority concluded that "the doctrine of claim
differentiation does not serve to broaden claims beyond their meaning
in light of the specification.... and does not override clear statements
of scope in the specification and prosecution history." 20
Accordingly, the majority found that the term "including" of
clause 6 in claim 16 required that the restriction ring be attached to
the cover.
Thus, the majority reversed the district court's
interpretation of clause 6 in claim 16.
III. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissenting opinion by Judge Rader finds at least three areas
where he believed the majority's opinion was wrong in narrowly
construing the term "including." First, ordinary dictionaries and law
dictionaries leave no doubt that the ordinary meaning of "includes" is
not limited to physical attachment. 21 Second, traditionally speaking,
the term "including" is used to signify a broader relationship than
17. Id.
18. Id. Note that the Federal Circuit cites 37 C.F.R. § 1.83(a) (1999) ("The drawing in a
nonprovisional application must show every feature of the invention specified in the claims") as
somehow supporting their position, unfortunately, 37 C.F.R. 1.83(a) has nothing to do with
claim construction.
19. Toro, 199 F.3d at 1301. (citing, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863
F.2d 855, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Question: Was claim 16 part of the original description that
could bootstrap itself as self-defining the scope of the invention and therefore never be broader
than that disclosed?
20. Id. at 1302 (citations omitted).
21. See id. at 1303 (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
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merely being attached 2 2 Third, Judge Raider believed that the
specification described more than one embodiment, specifically, an
embodiment in which the flow restriction ring is not permanently
23
attached to the cover.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

As to the first disputed claim phrase, the Federal Circuit allowed
the prior art to expand claim coverage with respect to equivalents for
means plus function elements. Although this result was assisted
somewhat by the clearly erroneous standard of review, it is
nevertheless significant that prior art was used to broaden the
available range of equivalents. While means plus function claim
elements are not generally restricted by the prior art, courts have been
reluctant to provide such claim elements anything but a narrow scope
of equivalents. Here, the background section of the '528 patent
mentioned the prior art reference that assisted with broadened
equivalents determination, but its discussion of the prior art reference
was with respect to a general introduction of convertible
vacuum/blowers and thus was not in reference to a particular problem
24
that the invention solved.
As to the second disputed claim phase, the majority's narrow
reading of the term "including" resembles the Federal Circuit's trend
in interpreting claims narrowly when there is doubt as to what is
covered. However, in this case, the meaning of the term "including"
was sufficiently clear and there was no reasonable justification for the
majority's narrow interpretation.
The majority's failure to appreciate the specification led them to
erroneously conclude that the specification had clear statements
against the ring being anything but attached to the cover. Unlike the
majority's conclusions, there are no clear statements of scope in the
specification or the prosecution history that would lead someone to
believe that "includes" should be narrowly ready5 Further, looking at
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1303-1304. Here, the dissenting opinion states: "More important, the
inventor contrasts the preferred embodiment not, as the court thinks, with disadvantageous prior
art, but rather with a less-preferred embodiment of the invention at hand: a blower with a
replaceable, i.e., non-attached, ring." Id. at 1303. See also '528 patent, col. 7 (lines 6-12).
24. The problems associated with the prior art were however not focused on the attaching
of the cover, but instead on safety hazards when converting its modes as well as on velocity of
air being output.
25. The majority points to nothing in the prosecution history as assisting their
interpretation.
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the language at column 7, lines 6-12 of the '528 patent (on which the
majority places so much emphasis), one should note that it states that
the automatic nature of removing of the ring (by being part of the
cover) is "also advantageous." The word "also" suggests that this
feature of the invention is not mandatory. In other words, this section
of the '528 patent is indicating that it is advantageous to have the
restriction ring part of the cover. Normally, such a statement would
suggest that the feature is then an optional (i.e., not mandatory)
feature of the invention. The majority's reading of this same portion
of the '528 patent to say that there are clear statements of scope in the
specification for their narrow interpretation is without justification.
The dissent is much closer to the mark on this point.
The majority has narrowed the term "including" to the primary
However, patent
embodiment described in the '528 patent.
practitioners, those who actually write the patent claims, would not
have construed the term "including" the way that the majority opinion
does. The term "including" is designed to be a broad open-ended
term.2 6 It is not intended to provide a structural indication in most
cases. According to the majority's rationale, the interpretation of the
term "including" was read in a narrow fashion because the majority
felt that was the scope that was described in the body of the
27
specification.
Still further, dependant claim 17 with the help of the doctrine of
claim differentiation clearly indicates that "including" in claim 16
was intended to be broader than "carried by" as was used in claim 17.
The majority shows no respect for the beleaguered doctrine of claim
differentiation. Had the majority had any respect for the doctrine, this
case would have seemed to be the perfect situation where the doctrine
would be helpful in determining whether the applicant intended to use
26. It is also used essentially interchangeably with "comprising," particularly when used
as a transition phrase. See, e.g., J. LANDIS, MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 7
(1970); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.06[1][b], at 8-101 (1998) ("including"
can also be used to draft an "open" claim); Hewlett Packard Company v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil
Manufacturing, 123 F.3d 1445, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim term "including" is synonymous
with "comprising" as a transition phrase at least thereby permitting the inclusion of unnamed
components).
27. While the body of the specification was such that the primary embodiment did have
the ring attached to the cover, if a patent practitioner had intended the claims to be so limited,
they would have used language such as "part of" or "attached" in the claim instead of
"including". The majority also ignores column 7, lines 12-18 of the '528 patent which states
that another advantage of the invention is using a safety switch mechanism. This advantage was
not mandatory to claim 16, but the majority's improper reading of the preceding sentence in the
'528 patent was deemed mandatory. In reality, these were merely recitations of potential
advantages obtained by the invention, not mandatory requirements.
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the term "including" broadly.
In effect, the majority's opinion suggests that regardless of what
language a claim may use, the claim can be limited to the primary
embodiment described in the body of the patent's specification. In
other words, the majority suggests that claims cannot be construed
apart from the specification and that claims, which are potentially
broader, can be narrowly construed. This suggestion of the majority's
opinion is wrong because the claims define the invention and can
exceed the scope of the body of the specification. Of course, one
could always blame the patent practitioner for perhaps not using the
best choice of claim language for clause 6 in claim 16.28
Another interesting result of this case was that the first disputed
claim phrase, which was interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, was
given a liberal interpretation, while the second disputed claim phrase,
which was not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, was given a
restrictive interpretation. In any event, the case was remanded back
to the district court for consideration of whether White's product
infringes claim 16 under the doctrine of equivalents. If the prior art
and the prosecution history allow, White's product would likely be
found to infringe claim 16 under the doctrine of equivalents.

28. Namely, claim 16 would have been better if the means for increasing the pressure
were recited simply as that and not utilizing the associative language "said cover including."

